Security Vision - User contributions [en]

The Government of the Bahamas

2024-02-27T14:58:08Z

Rose-Lise: Rose-Lise moved page The Government of the Bahamas to Government of the Bahamas: The article "The" unnecessary

#REDIRECT [[Government of the Bahamas]]

Government of the Bahamas

2024-02-27T14:58:08Z

Rose-Lise: Rose-Lise moved page The Government of the Bahamas to Government of the Bahamas: The article "The" unnecessary

{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=The Government of the Bahamas
|Creation Date=1973-06-22
|City=Nassau (BS)
|Address=Government House, 3MG4+85M, Duke St, Nassau
|Institution Type=Government
|Institution Sector=Government
|URL=https://www.bahamas.gov.bs/wps/portal/public/gov/government/!ut/p/b1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOKNDdx9HR1NLHzdTQ3MDDxDA3wcA8w9jPy9jYAKIoEKDHAARwNC-sP1o_AqMTGAKsBjhZ9Hfm6qfkFuhEGWiaMiALGJzU0!/dl4/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/
}}
==Description==

Springfield (NA)

2024-02-19T16:13:19Z

Rose-Lise: Rose-Lise moved page Springfield (NA) to Springfield (SC): Quotation refers to Springfield in South Carolina

#REDIRECT [[Springfield (SC)]]

Springfield (SC)

2024-02-19T16:13:19Z

Rose-Lise: Rose-Lise moved page Springfield (NA) to Springfield (SC): Quotation refers to Springfield in South Carolina

{{City
|is in Country=USA
|has Coordinates=33.49682, -81.27927
|Has Coordinates=33.4968163, -81.2792711
}}
<blockquote>Springfield, Orangeburg County, South Carolina, United States [[CiteRef::atlasofsurveillance2022]]</blockquote>

=== Additional properties ===

* CiteRef [[CiteRef::atlasofsurveillance2022]]
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Springfield (SC)

2024-02-19T16:12:03Z

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Facial Analysis Comparison and Evaluation (FACE) Services Unit

2024-02-19T15:52:48Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Facial Analysis Comparison and Evaluation (FACE) Services Unit
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=FBI Headquarters
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001
|Is Department Of=FBI
|URL=https://www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/privacy-impact-assessments/facial-analysis-comparison-and-evaluation-face-services-unit#:~:text=the%20Information%20System-,The%20Facial%20Analysis%2C%20Comparison%2C%20and%20Evaluation%20(FACE)%20Services,of%20persons%20associated%20with%20open
}}
==Description==
Automated and manual review of images

U.S Postal Service

2024-02-19T15:52:13Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=United States Postal Service
|Creation Date=1971-07-02
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=475 L'Enfant Plaza SW, Washington, DC 20260
|Is Department Of=US Federal Government
|Institution Type=Government
|Institution Sector=Administration
|URL=https://www.usps.com/
}}
==Description==

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

2024-02-19T15:51:35Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
|Creation Date=2003-03-02
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=500 12th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C.
|Is Department Of=Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
|Institution Type=Government
|URL=https://www.ice.gov/
|Not in graph=Greens Report 2021
}}
==Description==
==Operations==

===Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)===

===Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)===

==Controversies==

===[[Clearview AI]] controversy===
<blockquote>“ICE’s use of facial recognition technology is primarily used by [[Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)]] special agents investigating child exploitation and other cybercrime cases,” the spokesperson said. “ICE [[Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)]] officers have also occasionally used the technology, as task force officers with HSI and the Department of Justice, and through training, on human trafficking investigations.”<ref>‘Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Has Been Used By The Justice Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, And The NBA’, BuzzFeed News, accessed 28 February 2020, <nowiki>https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law-enforcement</nowiki>.</ref></blockquote>

==References==
<references />

Aerial surveillance of protests in Washington, D.C

2024-02-19T15:51:13Z

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{{Deployments
|Information Certainty=Rumoured
|CiteRef=biddleMarshalsUsedDrones2021
|Deployment Status=Concluded
|Deployment Type=Surveillance
|Has event={{HasEvent||2020-06-05|Documented|biddleMarshalsUsedDrones2021}}
|City=Washington (DC)
|Country=USA
|managed by=US Marshalls
|used by=US Marshalls
|Involved Entities=Unknown Institution 0050
|Datasets Used=Unknown Dataset 0029
|Software Deployed=Unknown Products 0010
}}
Following the murder of George Floyd by police officers in the summer of 2020, large protests against police brutality were held around the US. At two large protests in Washington, D.C, it was found that US Marshals flew drones over the protestors. The source of the information are documents and emails that the ACLU obtained via a Freedom of Information Request. It is not known why, or by the request of whom, the drones were flown. It is suspected that there was collaboration with other federal bodies.

<blockquote> Documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union that same year via the Freedom of Information Act were also heavily redacted, providing only murky outlines of how the agency was conducting aerial surveillance. These ACLU documents stated that the Marshals possessed a “rapidly deployable overhead collection device that will provide a multi-role surveillance platform to assist in [redacted] detection of targets.” Another document provided to the ACLU noted that the marshals deployed surveillance drones through their Technical Operations Group, or TOG, which “provides the U.S. Marshal Service, other federal agencies, and any requesting state or local law enforcement agency, with the most timely and technologically advanced electronic surveillance and investigative intelligence available in the world,” according to the Marshals Service website. The Marshals’ spokesperson, however, told The Intercept, “No USMS UAS flights were conducted at the request of any other agency” [[CiteRef::biddleMarshalsUsedDrones2021]] </blockquote>
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Department of Justice (DOJ)

2024-02-19T15:51:09Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Department of Justice (DOJ)
|Creation Date=1870-07-02
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20530
|Is Department Of=US Federal Government
|Institution Type=Government
|URL=https://www.justice.gov/
|Related Institutions=FBI
}}
==Description==

Biometric surveillance practices of ICE

2024-02-19T15:49:23Z

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{{Deployments
|Information Certainty=Documented
|CiteRef=braynePredictSurveilData2021, bedoyaCruelNewEra2020, georgetowncentreonprivacytechnologyAmericanDragnetDataDriven2022
|Deployment Status=Ongoing
|Deployment Type=Surveillance
|Has event={{HasEvent|Start|2008-01-02|Documented|georgetowncentreonprivacytechnologyAmericanDragnetDataDriven2022}}
|City=Washington (DC)
|Country=USA
|managed by=Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
|used by=Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
|Involved Entities=DHS, FBI, US Federal Government
|Datasets Used=Clearview AI (Dataset), Palantir (Dataset), Unknown Dataset 0057
|Software Deployed=Clearview AI (Software), Palantir (Software)
}}
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) collects data on people in the USA at a mass scale. Some of this data is biometric. The purpose of ICE's data collection has always been to surveil and deport, but it is increasingly used in predictive decision making and increasingly interconnected with other private and public actors in data collection efforts. A recent 2 year investigation by Georgetowns Centre for Privacy & Technology highlights the extent of these practices and argues they are tantamount to a surveillance 'dragnet'. However, these practices at federal and local level are not novel, they can be traced to the founding of ICE post 9/11, and also far into the US's history as a state and federation. The involvement of Palantir, a data analysis and visualisation company, has extended the predictive elements of tracking and targeting certain populations or actions.

Dragnet surveillance is defined by Sarah Brayne as follows:

<blockquote> Dragnet surveillance, meaning surveillance tools that gather information on everyone, rather than merely those under suspicion. Dragnet surveillance widens and deepens social oversight: it includes a broader swath of people and can follow any single individual across a greater range of institutional settings. Dragnet surveillance is associated with three key transformations in the practice of policing: (1) the shift from query-based to alert-based systems makes it possible to systematically surveil an unprecedentedly large number of people; (2) individuals with no direct police contact are now included in law enforcement systems, lowering the threshold for inclusion in police databases; and (3) institutional data systems are integrated, with police now collecting and using information gleaned from institutions not typically associated with crime control.” [[CiteRef::braynePredictSurveilData2021]] </blockquote>

The results of the report specify the workings of the dragnet.

<blockquote> Our two-year investigation, including hundreds of Freedom of Information Act requests and a comprehensive review of ICE’s contracting and procurement records, reveals that ICE now operates as a domestic surveillance agency. Since its founding in 2003, ICE has not only been building its own capacity to use surveillance to carry out deportations but has also played a key role in the federal government’s larger push to amass as much information as possible about all of our lives. By reaching into the digital records of state and local governments and buying databases with billions of data points from private companies, ICE has created a surveillance infrastructure that enables it to pull detailed dossiers on nearly anyone, seemingly at any time. In its efforts to arrest and deport, ICE has – without any judicial, legislative or public oversight – reached into datasets containing personal information about the vast majority of people living in the U.S., whose records can end up in the hands of immigration enforcement simply because they apply for driver’s licenses; drive on the roads; or sign up with their local utilities to get access to heat, water and electricity [[CiteRef::georgetowncentreonprivacytechnologyAmericanDragnetDataDriven2022]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> In fact, ICE has used face recognition technology to search through the driver’s license photographs of around 1 in 3 (32%) of all adults in the U.S. The agency has access to the driver’s license data of 3 in 4 (74%) adults and tracks the movements of cars in cities home to nearly 3 in 4 (70%) adults. When 3 in 4 (74%) adults in the U.S. connected the gas, electricity, phone or internet in a new home, ICE was able to automatically learn their new address. Almost all of that has been done warrantlessly and in secret [[CiteRef::georgetowncentreonprivacytechnologyAmericanDragnetDataDriven2022]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> A review of over 100,000 spending transactions by ICE reveals that the agency spent approximately $2.8 billion between 2008 and 2021 on new surveillance, data collection and data-sharing initiatives. Those transactions also reveal that ICE was building up advanced surveillance capacities roughly half a decade earlier than previously known. Until now, the earliest records obtained by the Center on Privacy & Technology suggested that ICE began requesting and using face recognition searches on state and local data sets in 2013. However, our research uncovered a contract from 2008 between ICE and the biometrics contractor L-1 Identity Solutions. The contract enabled ICE to access the Rhode Island motor vehicle department’s face recognition database to “recognize criminal aliens.” That places the first known ICE face recognition searches during the waning days of the George W. Bush administration
[[CiteRef::georgetowncentreonprivacytechnologyAmericanDragnetDataDriven2022]] </blockquote>

These practices have been reported since 2020 by journalists.

<blockquote> Hundreds of thousands of undocumented people have trusted state DMVs with that information to apply for driver’s privileges. However, in at least five of those 17 jurisdictions, ICE can warrantlessly search through state driver records for the purpose of civil immigration enforcement. In at least six of those 17 jurisdictions, ICE has used face recognition to scan drivers’ license photographs to carry out deportations [[CiteRef::georgetowncentreonprivacytechnologyAmericanDragnetDataDriven2022]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> Many immigrants avoid contact with any government agency, even the DMV, but they can’t go without heat, electricity, or water; ICE aimed to find them, too. So, that same year, ICE paid for access to a private database that includes the addresses of customers from 80 national and regional electric, cable, gas, and telephone companies. Amid this bonanza, at least, the Obama administration still acknowledged red lines. Some data were too invasive, some uses too immoral. Under Donald Trump, these limits fell away [[CiteRef::bedoyaCruelNewEra2020]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> In 2017, breaking with prior practice, ICE started to use data from interviews with scared, detained kids and their relatives to find and arrest more than 500 sponsors who stepped forward to take in the children. At the same time, ICE announced a plan for a social media monitoring program that would use artificial intelligence to automatically flag 10,000 people per month for deportation investigations. (It was scuttled only when computer scientists helpfully indicated that the proposed system was impossible.) The next year, ICE secured access to 5 billion license plate scans from public parking lots and roadways, a hoard that tracks the drives of 60 percent of Americans—an initiative blocked by Department of Homeland Security leadership four years earlier. In August, the agency cut a deal with Clearview AI, whose technology identifies people by comparing their faces not to millions of driver photos, but to 3 billion images from social media and other sites [[CiteRef::bedoyaCruelNewEra2020]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> This is where Palantir’s work for ICE comes into focus. A panoply of companies collect the data. Palantir connects the dots. The firm helps agents access different databases, build profiles from disparate sources, from commercial data brokers to driver’s license records, and see how targets interrelate to each other. The company’s software appears to be part of the agency’s largest and most aggressive enforcement actions. Indeed, the plan for the 2017 operation that first targeted the sponsors of unaccompanied immigrant kids, obtained by the immigrant rights group Mijente, reveals a complex web of interlocking agencies, including Health and Human Services, Customs and Border Protection, and two branches of ICE. To track the moving pieces, the paper repeatedly tells officials to enter data into “ICM,” ICE’s custom-built Investigative Case Management software. Who wrote that code? Palantir [[CiteRef::bedoyaCruelNewEra2020]] </blockquote>

Th extent of the practices and their evolution is difficult to trace.

<blockquote> While a few political leaders have pressed ICE in oversight letters and used appropriations riders to end the most aggressive of ICE’s actions, to date there has not been one full congressional hearing or Government Accountability Office (GAO) report focused on ICE surveillance [[CiteRef::georgetowncentreonprivacytechnologyAmericanDragnetDataDriven2022]] </blockquote>
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Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)

2024-02-19T15:47:53Z

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{{Institution
|City=Washington (DC)
|Is Department Of=Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
|Institution Type=Government
|Not in graph=Greens Report 2021
|Research Category=Object of Analysis
}}
==Description==

DHS

2024-02-19T15:47:11Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
|Creation Date=2002-11-25
|City=Washington (DC)
|Is Department Of=US Federal Government
|Institution Type=Government
|URL=https://www.dhs.gov/
|Not in graph=Greens Report 2021
|Research Category=Object of Analysis
}}
==Description==

DoD

2024-02-19T15:46:39Z

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{{Institution
|City=Washington (DC)
|Is Department Of=US Government
|Institution Type=Government
|Institution Sector=Security
|Not in graph=Greens Report 2021
}}
==Description==

Federal Agencies and ID.me

2024-02-19T15:46:33Z

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{{Deployments
|Information Certainty=Documented
|CiteRef=haskinsIDMeTorrid2022, metzFacerecognitionBacklashID2022
|Deployment Status=Stopped
|Deployment Type=Analytics, Testing
|City=Washington (DC)
|Country=USA
|managed by=ID.me
|used by=Internal Revenue Service USA, Social Security Administration USA
|Datasets Used=ID.me (Dataset)
|Software Deployed=ID.me (Authentication)
}}
A range of federal bodies such as the IRS required authentication using ID.me during the pandemic. As these bodies include social security payments and public revenue services they are not optional services.

<blockquote> In the first two years of the pandemic, identity verification company ID.me secured dozens of contracts with the IRS, Social Security Administration, and state unemployment agencies, ostensibly to reduce fraudulent access to government benefits [[CiteRef::haskinsIDMeTorrid2022]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> ID.me's rush to hire and train nearly 1,500 new workers at this time also led to lax verification practices and poor user privacy protections, these people said. Information like passports and social security numbers were often posted in internal Slack channels, and some employees were hired and given access to confidential data without completed background checks. Some chattered about how easy it would be to steal users' information [[CiteRef::haskinsIDMeTorrid2022]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> With a company laptop, email representatives and video chat agents can see any piece of information about any ID.me user — even people they never talk to. They could look up a user's email, and then find the information, documents, and selfie they submitted to ID.me, these people said. Customer service workers also described a tab on ID.me's internal dashboard that showed all potential facial recognition matches when a user submitted a selfie for verification. This was to catch possible fraudulent accounts, but these people said the system would often show profiles of clearly different people [[CiteRef::haskinsIDMeTorrid2022]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> ID.me also said that, starting March 1, it will allow ID.me users to delete the selfie tied to their account online at account.ID.me. In the past, ID.me has said it does not sell its user data — which includes biometric and related information, such as selfies people upload, data related to facial analyses, and recordings of user video chats — but it does keep such information. Biometric data, like the facial geometry produced from a user's selfie, may be kept for years after a user closes their account. The changes come shortly after the IRS, following backlash from lawmakers and privacy groups, said on Monday that it would "transition away" from using facial recognition software via ID.me to verify people for online accounts. Once a user had been authenticated via ID.me, they would be able to sign on to the IRS's website to request an online tax transcript or see information regarding tax payments or economic impact payments. The process had been optional for those who already had an IRS username and password, but those were set to stop working this summer [[CiteRef::metzFacerecognitionBacklashID2022]] </blockquote>
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FBI

2024-02-19T15:45:49Z

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{{Institution
|City=Washington (DC)
|Is Department Of=Department of Justice (DOJ)
|Institution Type=Government
|Not in graph=Greens Report 2021
|Research Category=Object of Analysis
}}
==Description==

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

2024-02-19T15:45:19Z

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U.S House of Representatives

2024-02-19T15:44:40Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=U.S House of Representatives
|Creation Date=1789-03-04
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=Washington, DC 20515
|Is Department Of=US Federal Government
|Institution Type=Government
|URL=https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/u-s-house-of-representatives
}}
==Description==

U.S Department of the Interior

2024-02-19T15:44:15Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=U.S Department of the Interior
|Creation Date=1849-03-03
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=1849 C Street NW, Washington, DC 20240
|Is Department Of=US Federal Government
|Institution Type=Government
|URL=https://www.doi.gov/
}}
==Description==

U.S Capitol Police

2024-02-19T15:43:50Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=U.S Capitol Police
|Creation Date=1828-05-02
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=119 D St NE, Washington, DC 20510
|Is Department Of=US Federal Government
|Institution Type=Law Enforcement
|URL=https://www.uscp.gov/
}}
==Description==

U.S National Park Service

2024-02-19T15:43:27Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=U.S National Park Service
|Creation Date=1916-08-25
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=Main Interior Building 1849 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20240
|Is Department Of=U.S Department of the Interior
|Institution Type=Government
|URL=https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/national-park-service
}}
==Description==

National Institute of Justice

2024-02-19T15:43:03Z

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{{Institution
|City=Washington (DC)
|Institution Type=Government
}}
==Description==

Wolfcom sale to DOD

2024-02-19T15:42:58Z

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{{Deployments
|City=Washington (DC)
|Country=USA
|managed by=DoD
|used by=DoD
|Software Deployed=Wolfcom (Software)
|Excluded from graph=Greens Report 2021
}}
[[Not in graph::Greens Report 2021]]

Use of Clearview AI by at least 10 federal agencies

2024-02-19T15:41:57Z

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{{Deployments
|Information Certainty=Documented
|CiteRef=u.s.governmentaccountabilityofficeFacialRecognitionTechnology2021
|Deployment Status=Concluded
|Deployment Type=Criminal investigations, Surveillance
|Has event={{HasEvent|Start|2015-01-02|Documented|u.s.governmentaccountabilityofficeFacialRecognitionTechnology2021}}{{HasEvent|End|2020-03-02|Documented|u.s.governmentaccountabilityofficeFacialRecognitionTechnology2021|As recorded}}
|City=Washington (DC)
|Country=USA
|managed by=Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Clearview AI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), FBI, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S Capitol Police, U.S Secret Service, U.S. Park Police, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, US Marshalls
|used by=Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), FBI, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S Capitol Police, U.S Secret Service, U.S. Park Police, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, US Marshalls
|Involved Entities=U. S Government Accountability Office
|Datasets Used=Clearview AI (Dataset), Unknown Dataset 0084
|Software Deployed=Clearview AI (Software)
}}
The U.S Government Accountability Office was asked to carry out a report by representativs into the use of facial recognition by federal agencies.

<blockquote> GAO was asked to review federal law enforcement use of facial recognition technology. This report examines the 1) ownership and use of facial recognition technology by federal agencies that employ law enforcement officers, 2) types of activities these agencies use the technology to support, and 3) the extent that these agencies track employee use of facial recognition technology owned by nonfederal entities. GAO administered a survey questionnaire to 42 federal agencies that employ law enforcement officers regarding their use of the technology. GAO also reviewed documents (e.g., system descriptions) and interviewed officials from selected agencies (e.g., agencies that owned facial recognition technology). This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in April 2021. Information that agencies deemed sensitive has been omitted [[CiteRef::u.s.governmentaccountabilityofficeFacialRecognitionTechnology2021]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> Eleven agencies we surveyed used systems with facial recognition technology belonging to non-government entities, including Clearview AI (10 agencies) and Vigilant Solutions (five agencies) [[CiteRef::u.s.governmentaccountabilityofficeFacialRecognitionTechnology2021]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> Information regarding the extent that agencies used Clearview AI and Vigilant Solutions has been omitted from this report, as some agencies deemed the information sensitive [[CiteRef::u.s.governmentaccountabilityofficeFacialRecognitionTechnology2021]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> Some agencies reported that they only used Clearview AI or Vigilant Solutions on a free trial basis, and thus, did not enter into a formal contract with the service provider. Other non-government entities that agencies reported using included Amazon Rekognition, BI SmartLink, and Giant Oak Social Technology, among others [[CiteRef::u.s.governmentaccountabilityofficeFacialRecognitionTechnology2021]] </blockquote>

Following the murder of of George Floyd by police officers the U.S postal Service used Clearview:

<blockquote> Used Clearview AI to help identify individuals suspected of criminal activity that took place in conjunction with the period of civil unrest, riots, or protests. This criminal activity included damaging U.S. Postal Service property, stealing mail, opening mail, burglarizing U.S. Postal Service buildings, and committing arson [[CiteRef::u.s.governmentaccountabilityofficeFacialRecognitionTechnology2021]] </blockquote>

Following the insurrection on January 6 2021:

<blockquote> U.S. Capitol Police used Clearview AI to help generate investigative leads. The agency also requested that another federal agency use its system to conduct facial recognition searches on behalf of the U.S. Capitol Police [[CiteRef::u.s.governmentaccountabilityofficeFacialRecognitionTechnology2021]] </blockquote>
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U. S Government Accountability Office

2024-02-19T15:41:11Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=U. S Government Accountability Office
|Creation Date=1921-01-02
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=441 G St NW, Washington, DC 20226
|Is Department Of=U.S Congress
|Institution Type=Government
|Institution Sector=Advocacy
|URL=https://www.gao.gov/
}}
==Description==

US Federal Government

2024-02-19T15:39:04Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=US Federal Government
|Creation Date=1789-03-04
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20500
|Institution Type=Government
|URL=https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/our-government/
}}
==Description==

U.S. Postal Inspection Service

2024-02-19T15:38:39Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=U.S. Postal Inspection Service
|Creation Date=1775-08-07
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=10500 Little Patuxent Pkwy #200, Columbia, MD 21044
|Is Department Of=United States Postal Service
|Institution Type=Law Enforcement
|URL=https://www.uspis.gov/
|Related Institutions=US Federal Government
}}
==Description==

U.S Secret Service

2024-02-19T15:38:12Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=U.S Secret Service
|Creation Date=1865-07-05
|City=Washington (DC)
|Address=245 Murray Ln SW - BLDG T-5, Washington, DC 20223
|Is Department Of=US Federal Government
|Institution Type=Law Enforcement
|URL=https://www.secretservice.gov/
}}
==Description==

Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

2024-02-19T15:37:04Z

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Kyiv

2024-02-19T15:36:06Z

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{{City
|is in Country=Ukraine
|has Coordinates=50.45003, 30.52414
}}
Also spelled Kiev

Network Optix

2024-02-19T15:31:03Z

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{{Institution
|City=Burbank
|Branches=Adelaide, Amsterdam, Barcelona, London, Moscow, Paris, Taipei, Kyiv
|Institution Type=Company
|URL=https://www.networkoptix.com/
|Not in graph=Greens Report 2021
|Keywords=Video Management
}}
==Description==
IP Video Management

Convergint

2024-02-19T15:26:10Z

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{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Convergint
|Creation Date=2001-01-02
|City=Chicago (IL)
|Address=1 Commerce Dr Schaumburg, IL, 60173-5302
|Branches=Asunción, Baltimore (MD), Indianapolis (IN), Jacksonville (FL), Las Vegas (NV), Los Angeles (CA), Luxembourg (City), Madison (WI), Melbourne, Mexico City, Miami (FL), Minneapolis (MN), Montreal, Mount Laurel NJ, Nashville (TN), New Orleans (LA), New York City (NY), Oklahoma City, Ottawa, Pelham AL, Perth, Phoenix, Portland OR, San Antonio TX, San Jose CA, Sioux Falls SD, Sydney, Warsaw, Pelham NH, Memphis, Baton Rouge, Raleigh (NC), Sacramento (CA), Salt Lake City (UT), Pittsburgh (PA), Austin (TX), Tampa (FL)
|Institution Type=Company
|Institution Sector=Security
|URL=https://www.convergint.com/
}}
==Description==

Convergint

2024-02-19T15:24:01Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Convergint
|Creation Date=2001-01-02
|City=Chicago (IL)
|Address=1 Commerce Dr Schaumburg, IL, 60173-5302
|Branches=Asunción, Austin TX, Baltimore (MD), Indianapolis (IN), Jacksonville (FL), Las Vegas (NV), Los Angeles (CA), Luxembourg (City), Madison (WI), Melbourne, Mexico City, Miami (FL), Minneapolis (MN), Montreal, Mount Laurel NJ, Nashville (TN), New Orleans (LA), New York City (NY), Oklahoma City, Ottawa, Pelham AL, Perth, Phoenix, Portland OR, San Antonio TX, San Jose CA, Sioux Falls SD, Sydney, Tampa FL, Warsaw, Pelham NH, Memphis, Baton Rouge, Raleigh (NC), Sacramento (CA), Salt Lake City (UT), Pittsburgh (PA)
|Institution Type=Company
|Institution Sector=Security
|URL=https://www.convergint.com/
}}
==Description==

Honeywell International

2024-02-19T15:22:21Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|City=Charlotte (NC)
|Institution Type=Company
|Institution Sector=Security
|Not in graph=Greens Report 2021
|Research Category=Object of Analysis
|Keywords=Video Analytics
}}
==Description==

Fulton County

2024-02-19T15:20:27Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Fulton County
|Creation Date=1853-01-02
|City=Atlanta (GA)
|Address=Peachtree Center North Tower, 235 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 1400. Atlanta, GA
|Is Department Of=State of Georgia
|Institution Type=Local Government
|Institution Sector=Administration
|URL=https://www.fultoncountyga.gov/
}}
==Description==

Georgia Institute of Technology

2024-02-19T15:19:49Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|City=Atlanta (GA)
|Institution Type=University
|Institution Sector=Academic
|Not in graph=Greens Report 2021
}}
==Description==

Raytheon Technologies

2024-02-19T15:16:58Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|City=Waltham MA
|Institution Type=Company
|Institution Sector=Security
|Not in graph=Greens Report 2021
}}
==Description==

Digital Watchdog

2024-02-19T15:14:46Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Digital Watchdog
|Creation Date=1988-01-02
|City=Tampa (FL)
|Address=5436 W Crenshaw St, Tampa, Florida, 33634
|Branches=Cerritos, Tampa (FL)
|Institution Type=Company
|Institution Sector=Security
|URL=https://digital-watchdog.com/
}}
==Description==

Washington police forces use facial recognition via the FITlist

2024-02-19T15:14:24Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Deployments
|Information Certainty=Documented
|CiteRef=hayesWashingtonPoliceAre2019
|Deployment Status=Stopped
|Deployment Type=Criminal investigations
|Has event={{HasEvent|Start|2016-01-02|Documented|hayesWashingtonPoliceAre2019}}
|City=Fircrest WA, Marysville WA, Richland WA, Tacoma (WA)
|Country=USA
|managed by=Pierce County Sheriff's Department
|used by=Fircrest Police Department, Seattle Police Department, Richland Police Department WA, Marysville Police Department WA
|Datasets Used=Unknown Dataset 0092
|Software Deployed=Unknown Products 0051
}}
Facial recognition tools are widely used by police departments both small and large in Washington, with Pierce County Sheriff acting as a central hub for cross-departmental requests which were found to have been made on an email list. In 2021, Washington banned the use of FRT.

<blockquote> Now, thanks to thousands of pages of previously undisclosed emails, OneZero can confirm the existence of a massive, secretive network of police departments working together to share these controversial facial recognition tools. The emails, which date back to at least 2016, also indicate that these departments explicitly tried to keep this cross-department partnership secret from the public. These emails were shared with OneZero from a source who obtained the documents through an open records request. Many of these cross-department requests in Washington state were made through a previously undisclosed email listserv known as FITlist. FITlist — with FIT standing for “Fraud and Identity Theft” — includes officers from at least a dozen police departments, from large organizations like the Seattle police and Pierce County Sheriff’s Department to smaller ones like the Richland and Marysville police. Officers on the listserv are encouraged to adopt a Fight Club-style directive that precludes group members from discussing the existence of the list publicly. One document explicitly says: “Do not mention FITlist in your reports or search warrant affidavits.” [[CiteRef::hayesWashingtonPoliceAre2019]] </blockquote>
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* [[Cited references::Security_Vision_Wiki_References#_SCITEe5b3aeed73567c52463af826dc8ef461]]
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RealNetworks

2024-02-19T15:13:18Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=RealNetworks
|Creation Date=1994-02-02
|City=Seattle (WA)
|Address=1501 1st Avenue S. · Suite 600. Seattle, WA 98134
|Institution Type=Company
|URL=https://realnetworks.com/
}}
==Description==

Washington State Fusion Centre

2024-02-19T15:12:50Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Washington State Fusion Centre
|Creation Date=2009-05-02
|City=Seattle (WA)
|Is Department Of=DHS
|Institution Type=Government
|URL=http://www.wsfc.wa.gov/
}}
==Description==

University of Washington

2024-02-19T15:12:24Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|City=Seattle (WA)
|Institution Type=University
|Not in graph=Greens Report 2021
}}
==Description==

Clearview AI used by Seattle Police Department

2024-02-19T15:11:55Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Deployments
|Information Certainty=Rumoured
|CiteRef=kieferSPDDetectiveUse2020, mascellinoSeattlePoliceOfficer2020
|Deployment Status=Concluded
|Deployment Type=Criminal investigations
|City=Seattle (WA)
|Country=USA
|managed by=Seattle Police Department
|used by=Seattle Police Department
|Datasets Used=Clearview AI (Dataset)
|Software Deployed=Clearview AI (Software)
}}
One Seattle police officer is found to have opened a Clearview AI account. While unclear whether it was used, it is also unclear whether one officer opening an account is strictly speaking against policy or not, which is notable from a legal standpoint.

<blockquote> Over the past year, more than a dozen Seattle Police Department officers have received promotional emails advertising a controversial artificial intelligence software called Clearview AI, which bills itself as a kind of Google search for faces. Clearview enables law enforcement agencies to identify unknown people—protest participants, for example—by matching their photos to online images and arrest or interrogate them after the fact. In March, one of the promotional emails made its way into then-Chief Carmen Best’s inbox, along with the inboxes of numerous other SPD officers of varying ranks. But only one officer—Detective Nicholas Kartes of the South Precinct’s burglary unit—appears to have taken the company’s offer, opening an account with his official Seattle email address more than a year ago [[CiteRef::kieferSPDDetectiveUse2020]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> Whether Kartes has been using the biometric service for surveillance purposes or not is unclear from the emails, but the officer did sign up for the service with his work email [[CiteRef::mascellinoSeattlePoliceOfficer2020]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> From a legal standpoint, SPD officers are not allowed to use Clearview AI for law enforcement purposes, since the software is not on the council’s list of approved technologies [[CiteRef::mascellinoSeattlePoliceOfficer2020]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> Clearview AI—which first attracted widespread attention late last year—is not on the council’s list of approved technologies. But according to Mary Dory, a public safety auditor currently working on the Kartes case with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), that ordinance doesn’t address the use of surveillance technology by individual officers
[[CiteRef::kieferSPDDetectiveUse2020]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> It’s also unclear whether Kartes violated department policy. To Office of Police Accountability Director Andrew Myerberg, the revelation that an SPD detective is using Clearview AI was alarming enough to prompt his office to launch an investigation, but he told PubliCola that the act of creating an account itself might not constitute a policy violation. “If they used the account for an investigation,” he added, “that would be a clear violation of policy.” [[CiteRef::kieferSPDDetectiveUse2020]] </blockquote>
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* [[Cited references::Security_Vision_Wiki_References#_SCITE48d3afab494e54cbc0ed3c04c09a418c]]
* [[Cited references::Security_Vision_Wiki_References#_SCITE6a0a6afbefd38a91377a34951598786a]]
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State of Illinois

2024-02-19T15:09:45Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=State of Illinois
|Creation Date=1813-12-02
|City=Springfield (IL)
|Address=Office of the Governor 207 State House Springfield, IL 62706
|Is Department Of=US Federal Government
|Institution Type=Regional Government
|URL=https://www.illinois.gov/
}}
==Description==

Seattle Mesh Network

2024-02-19T15:08:59Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Deployments
|Information Certainty=Rumoured
|CiteRef=kileySurveillanceSystemPublicsafety2018, fiske-verkerkQuestionsSeattlePolice2013
|Deployment Status=Concluded
|Deployment Type=Biometric Cameras, Criminal investigations
|Has event={{HasEvent|Start|2013-01-02|Documented|verkerkQuestionsSeattlePolice2013}}{{HasEvent|End|2018-01-02|Documented|kileySurveillanceSystemPublicsafety2018}}
|City=Seattle (WA)
|Country=USA
|managed by=Seattle City Council, Seattle Police Department
|used by=Seattle City Council, Seattle Police Department
|Involved Entities=Washington State Fusion Centre
|Datasets Used=Unknown Dataset 0063
|Software Deployed=Unknown Products 0027
}}
Seattle has dismantled an extensive network of federally funded cameras. Set up in 2013, they were allegedly turned off shortly after. However they were only dismantled in 2018. The resulting public scrutiny led to more revelations of surveillance technologies. Although it is not known whether facial recognition was in use, it has since been banned.

<blockquote> The proposed network includes some 30 high resolution video cameras to monitor waterfront areas throughout the city, including some far from the port. The cameras, some of which are capable of thermal imaging, will be connected by a new dedicated wireless data network designed primarily for police use. The network will have links to local transit and other systems. The ordinance authorizing the project was passed by the City Council and signed by the mayor in a largely perfunctory way. Pertinent details were left out of the council briefings. The new surveillance network was supposed to go live at the end of this month. But when news of the project broke in the West Seattle Blog, the resulting public outcry prompted Mayor McGinn to call for a “thorough public vetting” before deploying the system, and City Council veteran Nick Licata to draft new legislation to regulate it [[CiteRef::fiske-verkerkQuestionsSeattlePolice2013]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> The mesh network, according to the ACLU, news reports and anti-surveillance activists from Seattle Privacy Coalition, had the potential to track and log every wireless device that moved through its system: people attending protests, people getting cups of coffee, people going to a hotel in the middle of the workday. In November 2013, shortly after the news stories about it came out, SPD spokesman Sean Whitcomb announced: “The wireless mesh network will be deactivated until city council approves a draft (privacy) policy and until there’s an opportunity for vigorous public debate.” That policy never materialized. Now crews are tearing its hardware down and repurposing the usable parts for other city agencies, including Seattle Department of Transportation traffic cameras [[CiteRef::kileySurveillanceSystemPublicsafety2018]] </blockquote>

<blockquote> In 2018, new measures were passed to manage surveillance technologies. However little is known about their full scope.
In 2013, the city council passed a surveillance ordinance giving it more oversight in the acquisition of devices with surveillance capabilities. Last year, that ordinance was amended and bulked up, requiring city departments to report their surveillance-enabled technologies already in use and present them for review by the council. To date, city departments have identified 28 technologies — from Seattle Department of Transportation’s license-plate readers to SPD tools like iBase, a “crime analysis tool allows for configuring, capturing, controlling, analyzing and displaying complex information and relationships in link and entity data.” So what, exactly, does that do? “That’s the point,” Narayan said with a chuckle. “All we have now are vague descriptions — it could be anything from a simple graphic representation of a spreadsheet to a complex analytic tool that establishes relationships to show that somebody might be a gang member.” [[CiteRef::kileySurveillanceSystemPublicsafety2018]] </blockquote>
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Schenzen

2024-02-19T15:07:46Z

Rose-Lise: Changed redirect target from Shenzen to Shenzhen

#REDIRECT [[Shenzhen]]

San Francisco SafeCity Camera Program

2024-02-19T15:05:47Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Deployments
|Information Certainty=Documented
|CiteRef=bowlesWhyTechExecutive2020, sfsafeSFSafeCity2022, guarigliaSanFranciscoPolice2020
|Deployment Status=Ongoing
|Deployment Type=Criminal investigations, Surveillance
|City=San Francisco (CA)
|Country=USA
|managed by=Union Square Business Improvement District
|used by=SF SafeCity Camera Program
|Involved Entities=San Francisco Police Department
|Datasets Used=Avigilon (Dataset), Genetec (Dataset), Unknown Dataset 0015
|Software Deployed=Avigilon Facial Recognition, Genetec (Software)
}}
The camera networks that are being used in San Francisco were purportedly put in place to develop a SafeCity concept for the purposes of crime deterrence. The camera networks are operated by various non-profits. SafeCity San Francisco states that it does not use the cameras for live feeds or facial recognition. However the cameras have this potential and have been found to have been used as live feeds to identify protestors (which is illegal in San Francisco).

<blockquote>
The SF SafeCity Camera Program adheres to strict policies and procedures with privacy protocols in place; there is no live monitoring of the system, no facial recognition, no audio recording, and footage requests are only granted to law enforcement entities [[CiteRef::sfsafeSFSafeCity]]
</blockquote>

<blockquote>
The camera network is operated by the Union Square Business Improvement District (BID), a special taxation district created by the City and County of San Francisco, but operated by a private non-profit organization. These networked cameras, manufactured by Motorola Solutions' brand Avigilon, are high definition, can zoom in on a person's face to capture face-recognition ready images, and are linked to a software system that can automatically analyze content, including distinguishing between when a car or a person passes within the frame [[CiteRef::guarigliaSanFranciscoPolice2020]]
</blockquote>

<blockquote>
According to logs obtained by EFF, SFPD has regularly sought footage related to alleged looting and assault in the area associated with the ongoing protests against police violence. However, SFPD has gone beyond simply investigating particular incident reports and instead engaged in indiscriminate surveillance of protesters [[CiteRef::guarigliaSanFranciscoPolice2020]]
</blockquote>

<blockquote>
The technology that Mr. Larsen is using is sophisticated — video management from Motorola Solutions, evidence management from Genetec. Those same cameras, and the software supporting them, can be used for more than what they are currently doing [[CiteRef::bowlesWhyTechExecutive2020]]
</blockquote>
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* [[Cited references::Security_Vision_Wiki_References#_SCITE16701a9e9c7d6a131750be541dfe7457]]
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King County

2024-02-19T15:04:53Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=King County
|Creation Date=1852-12-22
|City=Seattle (WA)
|Address=King County Courthouse
516 Third Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104
|Is Department Of=State of Washington
|Institution Type=Local Government
|Institution Sector=Administration
|URL=https://kingcounty.gov/
}}
==Description==

Amazon

2024-02-19T15:04:24Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Amazon
|Creation Date=1994-07-05
|City=Seattle (WA)
|Address=410 Terry Ave. North, Seattle, WA, 98109-5210.
|Institution Type=Company
|URL=https://www.aboutamazon.com/
}}
==Description==

Seattle Police Department

2024-02-19T15:03:57Z

Rose-Lise:

{{Institution
|Institution Full Name=Seattle Police Department
|Creation Date=1869-06-02
|City=Seattle (WA)
|Address=610 5th Ave, Seattle, WA 98104
|Is Department Of=King County
|Institution Type=Law Enforcement
|URL=https://www.seattle.gov/police
}}
==Description==